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IRREGULAR MIGRATION ACROSS THE MEDITERRANEAN SEA: PROBLEMATIC ISSUES 
CONCERNING THE INTERNATIONAL RULES ON SAFEGUARD OF LIFE AT SEA
ABSTRACT: Migration by sea is a phenomenon which is largely associated with irregular 
flows and growing concern by destination States about border control and integrity of 
restrictive migration policies. Only incidentally, the human rights’ costs are extensively 
debated. The Mediterranean Sea is a crucial scenario which highlights the difficulty 
encountered by the Search and Rescue regime to cope with the techniques adopted by 
smugglers and with the additional tensions provoked by some features of EU migration 
law. The SAR provisions are inherently accompanied by certain elasticity, in order to 
take into account the variety of concrete situations. In a regional context characterized by 
political divergences among European states and between the latters and transit countries, 
some IMO and EU’s attempts to draw a solution are evaluated: it clearly emerges that the 
failures to find out a reasonable compromise are due to factors external to maritime law. 
Such factors must be addressed with more courage by the EU member states: the hot issue 
of the burden sharing; a really comprehensive dialogue with origin countries and transit 
countries on the complex subject of international migration; the renunciation to ask the 
cooperation of states with a negative human rights record. Absent a more far reaching 
policy, dramatic events and hidden deaths will sadly continue, as far as the crocodile tears 
of European politicians when some incident eventually reaches the attention of media and 
of public opinion.
KEYWORDS: irregular migration; maritime law; Search and Rescue regime; IMO; EU; 
burden sharing; human rights; international cooperation.
1 This article is a revised and updated version of an earlier paper from the same author, whose references are 
the following: “Irregular Migration and Safeguard of Life at Sea: International Rules and Recent Developments 
in The Mediterranean Sea”, in DEL VECCHIO, A. (ed.), International Law of the Sea: Current Trends and 
Controversial Issues, Eleven International Publishing, The Hague, forthcoming 2013.
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MIGRACIÓN IRREGULAR EN EL MAR MEDITERRÁNEO: ASPECTOS PROBLEMATICOS 
RELATIVOS A LAS REGLAS INTERNACIONALES SOBRE LA PROTECCIÓN DE LA VIDA EN MAR
RESUMEN: La migración vía mar es un fenómeno abundantemente asociado con los 
flujos irregulares y con la creciente preocupación por parte de los Estados de destino 
con respecto al control des sus fronteras y a la integridad de sus políticas migratorias 
restrictivas. Muy raramente, los aspectos relativos a los derechos humanos reciben la 
atención que merecerían. El Mar Mediterráneo representa un escenario crucial que destaca 
las dificultades que el régimen de búsqueda y rescate encuentra al enfrentarse con las 
técnicas empleadas por los traficantes y con las tensiones adicionales consecuencia de 
ciertas pautas del derecho de inmigración de la UE. Las disposiciones sobre las actividades 
SAR son inherentemente acompañadas por una cierta elasticidad, a fin de tomar en 
cuenta la variedad de las situaciones concretas. En un contexto regional caracterizado por 
divergencias políticas entre los Estados miembros de la UE y entre estos y los Estados de 
tránsito, algunas tentativas impulsadas por la OMI y la UE son evaluadas en el presente 
estudio: resulta que el fracaso en llegar a un razonable compromiso se debe a motivos 
ajenos al derecho marítimo. Tales factores deben ser abarcados con mas implicación por 
parte de los Estados miembros de la UE: el delicado tema de la repartición de las cargas; 
una diálogo realmente amplio con los países de origen y con los de tránsito sobre las 
complejidades de las migraciones internacionales; la renuncia, al mismo tiempo, a pedir 
la cooperación de países que no respetan con suficiencia los derechos humanos. A falta 
de una política más ambiciosa y de largo plazo, los eventos dramáticos y las muertes 
silenciosas están destinados a seguir, así como las “lagrimas de cocodrilo” de los políticos 
europeos que surgen cuando algún incidente llega a provocar la atención de los medios de 
comunicación y de la opinión publica.
PALABRAS CLAVES: migración irregular; derecho marítimo; régimen de búsqueda y 
rescate; OMI; UE; distribución de las cargas; derechos humanos; cooperación internacional.
MIGRATION IRREGULIERE DANS LA MER MEDITERRANEE: ASPECTS PROBLEMATIQUES 
CONCERNANT LES RÈGLES INTERNATIONALES SUR SAUVEGARDE DE VIE EN MER
RESUMÉ: la migration via mer est un phénomène qui est en grande partie associé aux 
flux irréguliers et à la préoccupation croissante  des États de destination relativement au 
contrôle de ses frontières et  à l’intégrité de ses politiques migratoires restrictives. Très 
rarement, les aspects relatifs aux droits de l’homme reçoivent l’attention qu’ils mériteraient. 
La Méditerranée est un scénario crucial qui met en évidence les difficultés rencontrées par 
le système de la Recherche et du Sauvetage quand il  fait face aux techniques adoptées 
par les trafiquants et  aux tensions additionnelles provoqués par certaines règles du droit 
d’immigration de l’UE. Les dispositions sur les activités SAR  sont  accompagnées par 
certaine élasticité, afin de  prendre en compte la variété des situations concrètes. Dans 
un contexte régional caractérisé par des divergences politiques entre les États membres 
de l’UE et entre ceux-ci et les États de transit, quelques tentatives poussées par l’OMI et 
l’UE sont évaluées dans  la présente étude : de toute évidence, il ressort que les échecs 
pour trouver un compromis raisonnable sont dus à des facteurs externes au droit maritime. 
Ces facteurs doivent être recouverts d’une plus grande participation des États membres de 
l’UE : la question sensible du partage de la charge, un très large dialogue avec les pays 
d’origine et de transit sur les complexités de la migration internationale;,le renoncement, 
au même temps, la demande de coopération des pays qui ne respectent pas suffisamment 
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les droits de l’homme. Á l’absence d’une politique  plus ambitieuse et à long terme, les 
événements dramatiques et morts silencieuses vont se poursuivre, et aussi les «larmes de 
crocodile» des politiciens européens qui se posent lorsqu’un incident vient à provoquer 
l’attention des médias communication et l’opinion publique.
MOTS CLÉS: migration irrégulière, droit maritime, système de Recherche et Sauvetage, 
OMI, UE, distribution des charges, droits de l’homme, coopération internationale.
I. THE PECULIAR ISSUES RAISED BY IRREGULAR MIGRATION BY SEA
In recent years, migration flows by sea across the Mediterranean and towards southern 
European Union (EU) Member States have increased significantly.3 Contrast actions by coastal 
states, either unilateral or coordinated through the Frontex agency, and the relevance of  
international rules concerning various subjects – law of  the sea, safeguard of  life at sea, human 
rights, non-refoulement of  persons in need of  international protection – raise a set of  problematic 
issues.4 Recently, the main international organizations dealt with irregular migration and the 
need to contrast it, underlining alternatively the related threat to security (together with 
terrorism and organized crime)5 or the need to conciliate control of  borders and migration 
policy choices with respect to aliens’ human rights and other international provisions.6
3 See (with further references) HINRICHS, X. “Measures Against Smuggling of Migrants at Sea: A Law of 
the Sea Related Perspective’, Revue belge de droit international, Vol. 36, 2003, p. 413, at pp. 413-414, 421, 
446-447; SPIJKERBOER, T., Trends in the Different Legislations of the Member States Concerning Asylum 
in the EU: The Human Costs of Border Control, study prepared on behalf of the Commission ‘Civil Liberties, 
Justice and Home Affairs’ of the European Parliament, July 2006, Doc. IPOL/C/LIBE/FWC/2005-23-SC1, PE 
378.25, at pp. 1-2; United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, Organized Crime and Irregular Migration From 
Africa to Europe, July 2006 <www.unodc.org/pdf/research/Migration_Africa.pdf>; COSLOVI, L., Brevi note 
sull’immigrazione via mare in Italia e Spagna, January 2007 <www.cespi.it/PDF/mig-mare.pdf>; DE HAAS, 
H., The Myth of Invasion. Irregular Migration From West Africa to the Maghreb and the European Union, IMI 
research report, University of Oxford, October 2007; WEINZIERL, R., LISSON, U., Border Management and 
Human Rights. A Study of EU Law and the Law of the Sea, German Institute for Human Rights, December 2007 
<www.institut-fuer-menschenrechte.de>, at p. 18.
4 In this perspective, the European Commission admitted in 2006 the need to carry out an in-depth legal and 
technical analysis: see the Communication ‘Reinforcing the Management of the European Union’s Southern 
Maritime Borders’, Doc. COM (2006) 733, 30 November 2006; the subsequent Commission Staff Working 
Document ‘Study on the International Law Instruments in Relation to Illegal Immigration by Sea’, Doc. SEC 
(2007) 691, 15 May 2007 (hereinafter, the Commission Working Document).
5 See the Berlin Declaration, signed on 25 March 2007 by the Presidency of the Council, the President of the 
Commission, the President of the European Parliament, on conclusion of the informal meeting of the Heads of 
State or Government, held in Berlin on 24 and 25 March 2007: see point II, where the undersigned undertake to 
jointly fight against “terrorism, organized crime and illegal immigration.”
6 See the amendments to the SOLAS and SAR Conventions, approved in 2004 by the International Maritime 
Organization (hereinafter, IMO), about which see infra, § 4; the UN GA Resolution of 23 February 2007, Doc. A/
RES/61/165, entitled “Protection of Migrants”, in particular §§ 6-7. See also the leaflet, co-authored in 2006 by 
IMO and the UN High Commissioner for Refugees (hereinafter, IMO & UNHCR), entitled Rescue at Sea. A Guide 
to Principles and Practice as Applied to Migrants and Refugees, at <www.unhcr.org/publ/PUBL/450037d34.
pdf>. More recently, see the accurate study published by the European Union Agency for Fundamental Rights 
(FRA), Fundamental rights at Europe’s southern sea borders, 2013, at < http://fra.europa.eu/en/publication/2013/
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Specific issues arise when irregular migration by sea is at stake. Recent experience shows 
a significant variety of  techniques, constantly adapted by smugglers in order to circumvent 
contrast strategies by coastal States: hiding of  stowaways in ferries or cargoes in regular 
service7; arrivals on board old ships in bad conditions and overloaded; use of  small boats 
driven by the migrants themselves and completely unsuited for long journeys (being usually 
devoted to short-term fishing); employment of  speed rubber dinghies and quick unloading 
of  migrants, often before reaching dry land and with brutal modalities, if  necessary, in 
order to avoid interception by the coast guard8 and, lastly, carrying out the major part of  the 
journey by means of  a medium- or large-sized boat that stops at the limit of  territorial waters, 
disembarking migrants with light launches that go back and forth between the coast and the 
‘mother’ boat.9
Practice highlights the growingly dangerous nature of  such movements and the 
occurrence of  tragic outcomes, about which precise statistics are inherently unavailable.10 In 
addition, such flows are very often mixed, in the sense that persons attempting irregular entry 
may be, at the same time, ordinary migrants, individuals in need of  international protection 
(either from the departure state or their own state, when different11) or other vulnerable 
persons (unaccompanied minors, sick persons, victims of  trafficking, pregnant women).
The issue at stake proves difficult because an ad hoc international regulation does not exist 
and destination countries may find themselves in the uncomfortable position of  tolerating 
arrivals without being able to effectively contrast them, if  genuine adherence to human rights 
standards is to be ensured (and smugglers know it perfectly). An overview of  applicable 
international rules, of  different origin, confirms such an impression: provisions on jurisdiction 
over maritime zones and on related coercive powers; obligations on safeguard of  life at sea 
and on search and rescue of  persons in distress; rules on human rights, especially the ones 
fundamental-rights-europes-southern-sea-borders> (hereinafter, the FRA study).
7 This issue will not be treated here, the attention being focused on journeys and boats entirely devoted to 
irregular migration: for a discussion of problems raised by stowaways, see among others BASTID-BURDEAU, 
G., ‘Migrations clandestines et droit de la mer’, in La mer et son droit. Melanges offerts a Laurent Lucchini et 
Jean-Pierre Quénedec, A. Pedone, Paris, 2003, p. 5, at pp. 60-64.
8 From Albania and Montenegro to Italy in the 1990s, from Somalia and other countries to Yemen in the Aden 
Gulf nowadays.
9 See the cases described in IMO Circular MSC/Circ. 896, Rev. 1.
10 See, for instance, the data reported in SPIJKERBOER, T., loc. cit., pp. 6-7; WEINZIERL, R., LISSON, 
U., loc. cit., p. 18; Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe, Lives Lost in the Mediterranean Sea: Who 
Is Responsible?, report presented by T. Strik to the Committee on Migration, Refugees and Displaced Persons, 
Doc. 12895, 5 April 2012; the FRA study, pp. 19-28. Additionally, see three sources, very different in nature but 
converging in drawing attention to the same problem: the UNHCR website section on mixed migration flows 
<www.unhcr.org/cgi-bin/texis/vtx/asylum>; the biannual circulars issued by the IMO Maritime Safety Committee 
on ‘Unsafe practices associated with the trafficking or transport of illegal migrants by sea’ <www.imo.org>; the 
data reported on the website Fortress Europe <http://fortresseurope.blogspot.com>.
11 Among the various sources on this subject, reference can be made to the web page <www.unhcr.org/cgi-bin/
texis/vtx/asylum> and to the special issue of the UNHCR review Refugee, entitled ‘Refugee or Migrant. Why It 
Matters’, Vol. 148, 2007, No. 4.
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concerning the right to leave a country and the protection of  persons in need of  international 
protection, including refugees.12
The purpose of  this article is to scrutinize only a part of  the relevant rules, namely the 
international provisions concerning safeguard of  life at sea in order to check whether the 
resulting framework is coherent or whether there is a contradiction or a tension between 
their abstract content and their practical enforcement. Particular emphasis will be placed on 
the Mediterranean Basin, on the solutions envisaged (or proposed) in International Maritime 
Organization (IMO) circles and on the role of  the EU and the ultimate effect of  its rules and 
policy choices. It will be demonstrated that some shortcomings and defects of  maritime law 
currently in force are owed to underlying policy choices (mainly of  European states and of  
the European Union) which should be seriously addressed in order to comprehensively tackle 
the challenges posed by irregular migration by sea and by the tragic outcome of  many voyages.
II. OBLIGATIONS AIMED AT SAFEGUARDING LIFE AT SEA: THE RELEVANT TREATY 
RULES
In the last few decades, the long-established maritime custom to provide comfort and 
take on board shipwrecked persons and those whose life is at risk has found wide recognition 
in positive international law. The United Nations (UN) and, especially, IMO devoted much 
attention to this issue, as witnessed by several treaties and related instruments.
The United Nations Convention on the Law of  Sea (UNCLOS) treats this topic in a 
general character provision, stating that every state shall require the master of  a ship flying its 
flag - in so far as he can do so without serious danger to the ship, the crew or the passengers 
- to render assistance to any person found at sea in danger of  being lost; to proceed with all 
possible speed to the rescue of  persons in distress, if  informed of  their need for assistance, in 
so far as such action may reasonably be expected of  him. In addition, every coastal state shall 
promote the establishment, operation and maintenance of  an adequate and effective search 
12 For a comprehensive overview of the various issues at stake, see (also for additional references) FISCHER-
LESCANO, A., LÖHR, T., TOHIDIPUR, T., ‘Border Controls at Sea: Requirements Under International Human 
Rights and Refugee Law’, International Journal of Refugee Law, Vol. 21, 2009, p. 265; BARNES, R., ‘The 
International Law of the Sea and Migration Control’, in RYAN, B., MITSILEGAS, V. (Eds.), Extraterritorial 
Migration Control: Legal Challenges, Martinus Nijhoff, Leiden, 2010, p. 103; MORENO-LAX, V., ‘Seeking 
Asylum in the Mediterranean: Against a Fragmentary Reading of EU Member States’ Obligations Accruing at 
Sea’, International Journal of Refugee Law, Vol. 23, 2011, p. 174; TREVISANUT, S., Immigrazione irregolare via 
mare. Diritto internazionale e diritto dell’Unione europea, Jovene, Napoli, 2012; RIJPMA, J.J., ‘The Patrolling of 
the European Union’s External Maritime Border: Preventing the Rule of Law From Getting Lost at Sea’, in DEL 
VECCHIO, A. (ed.), International Law of the Sea: Current Trends and Controversial Issues, Eleven International 
Publishing, The Hague, forthcoming 2013, § 4.2. On the non refoulement principle and its scope of application, 
see (also for additional references) DI FILIPPO, M.,‘L’ammissione di cittadini stranieri’, in CALAMIA, A.,M, DI 
FILIPPO, M., GESTRI, M. (eds.), Immigrazione, Diritto e Diritti: profili internazionalistici ed europei, Cedam, 
Padova, 2012, p. 81, at 92-113.
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and rescue service regarding safety on and over the sea and, where circumstances so require, 
by way of  mutual regional arrangements, cooperate with neighbouring states for this purpose 
(see Article 98, paragraph 2).
A more detailed regulation of  those issues can be found, however, in two older IMO 
Conventions, adopted in the seventies and amended on various occasions thanks to a simplified 
revision mechanism. According to the regulation in force before some recent amendments 
took effect (see below, § 4), the International Convention for the Safeguard of  Life at Sea, 
adopted in London on 1 November 1974 (hereinafter, SOLAS Convention),13 provided that 
the master of  a ship at sea that is in a position to be able to provide assistance, on receiving a 
signal from any source that persons are in distress at sea, is bound to proceed with all speed 
to their assistance, if  possible informing them or the search and rescue service that the ship 
is doing so14; moreover, the Convention required each contracting government to ensure that 
necessary arrangements are made for distress communication and coordination in its area of  
responsibility and for rescue of  persons in distress at sea around its coast. These arrangements 
shall include the establishment, operation and maintenance of  such search and rescue facilities 
as are deemed practicable and necessary, having regard to the density of  the seagoing traffic 
and the navigational dangers, and shall, so far as possible, provide adequate means of  locating 
and rescuing such persons.15
The International Convention on Search and Rescue at Sea, adopted in Hamburg on 
27 April 1979 (hereinafter, SAR Convention),16 reiterated the duty to set up SAR areas and 
the related rapid intervention services and added that parties shall ensure that assistance is 
provided to any person in distress at sea, doing it regardless of  the nationality or status of  such 
a person or the circumstances in which the person is found,17 and that an operation to retrieve 
persons in distress provides for their initial medical treatment or other needs and delivers them 
to a place of  safety.18
Against this background, it arises that both the master of  a vessel (no matter whether 
official or private) and the states (especially the one territorially competent for the relevant 
SAR region) must comply with several obligations, occasionally of  a certain degree of  intensity. 
Hence, it comes out that a state acting on the high seas with a view to protecting its maritime 
borders from unauthorized entries may be compelled to carry out an activity of  first assistance 
and taking on board of  irregular migrants, not being allowed to ignore their actual conditions 
13 Entered into force on 25 May 1980; 162 Contracting States as of 31 January 2013.
14 See Chapter V, Reg. 33, para. 1.
15 See Chapter V, Reg. 7.
16 Entered into force on 22 June 1985; 104 Contracting States as of 31 January 2013.
17 Chapter 2.1.10.
18 Chapter 1.3.2.
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and need for rescue.19 It is worth noting that intervention in favour of  a vessel in need of  
rescue is a duty and is not made conditional on its nationality.
Additionally, the above-mentioned treaty-based regimes did not solve every practical 
question: they present some interpretative doubts, require a proper implementation by states 
parties, and need the conclusion of  regional or bilateral agreements concerning the delimitation 
of  SAR zones and the coordination of  their activities. When coming to the law in action 
(especially in the Mediterranean Sea), we must face several problems that are able to produce 
a crises of  the rescue regime drafted by the relevant conventions. As aptly observed, “current 
concerns relating to rescue at sea are largely associated with irregular migration rather than 
with accidents or the malfunction of  vessels at sea,”20 and “international legal norms are faced 
with developments unforeseen at the time of  their drafting,” while “these same international 
norms are the only ones which apply in these new scenarios.”21
III. EU LAW AND SAR MATTERS
Before examining the main controversial issues, it must be added that the presence  of  
the EU increases complexity in the subject matter. The EU is not party to the SOLAS and SAR 
Conventions, but is party to the UNCLOS, although its declaration of  competence does not 
include SAR matters22. However, some aspects of  EU law may exacerbate current controversies 
concerning search and rescue activities. For instance, under the legislation currently in force 
(Dublin Regulation, Schengen Borders Code, Return Directive23), a principle may be derived 
according to which asylum seekers, refugees and irregular migrants must be taken in charge by 
the state whose borders have been first crossed. Notwithstanding the enunciation of  a general 
principle of  intra-EU solidarity in Article 80 TFEU,24 there is no permanent and automatic 
mechanism of  burden sharing among EU Member States with regard to irregular migratory 
19 Additionally, see the cases described by HINRICHS, X., loc. cit., pp. 445-447.
20 KLEIN, N., ‘International Migration by Sea and Air’, in OPESKIN, B., PERRUCHOUD, R., REDPATH-
CROSS, J. (Eds.), Foundations of International Migration Law, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2012, 
p. 260, at p. 275.
21 MALLIA, P., Migrant Smuggling by Sea. Combating a Current Threat to Maritime Security Through the 
Creation of a Cooperative Framework, Martinus Nijhoff, Leiden, 2010, p. 97.
22 Since the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty, the European Union succeeded to the legal obligations 
attributable to the European Community, which originally accessed the UNCLOS. 
23 For a description of such normative framework, see Rijpma 2013, § 4.3.
24 Art. 80 reads as follows: “The policies of the Union set out in this Chapter and their implementation shall 
be governed by the principle of solidarity and fair sharing of responsibility, including its financial implications, 
between the Member States. Whenever necessary, the Union acts adopted pursuant to this Chapter shall contain 
appropriate measures to give effect to this principle.” On the issue of intra-EU solidarity, see GESTRI, M., 
‘La politica europea dell’immigrazione: solidarietà tra Stati membri e misure nazionali di regolarizzazione’, 
in LIGUSTRO, A., SACERDOTI, G. (eds.), Problemi e tendenze del diritto internazionale dell’economia. 
Liber amicorum in onore di Paolo Picone, Editoriale Scientifica, Napoli, 2011, p. 895; DI FILIPPO, M., ‘La 
circolazione dello straniero nel diritto dell’Unione europea : una geometria variabile dei diritti e delle garanzie’, 
in CALAMIA, A.M., DI FILIPPO, M., GESTRI, M. loc. cit., p. 159, at 264-268.
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flows, by both land and sea.
In favour of  a particularly affected Member State, four main tools may be activated under 
procedures that are not excessively based upon political circumstances:
- Joint Frontex operations coordinated by Frontex, such as HERMES 2011, which was 
launched on 20 February 2011 to help Italy with maritime border surveillance, identification 
of  migrants and refugees as well as search and rescue operations at sea;
- Rapid Border Intervention Teams (RABITs) deployed by Frontex after a request 
from a Member State in need of  help for managing border controls. This tool, was first 
employed in 2010, in favour of  Greece, faced with an extraordinary incoming flow at the land 
border with Turkey;
- Financial assistance to be mobilised, especially under the External Borders Fund and 
European Refugee Fund, or even under the European Return Fund;
- Asylum Support Teams (AST), multidisciplinary teams of  EU experts deployed by 
the European Asylum Support Office (EASO) in a Member State for a limited time in order to 
back the asylum system of  that Member State. Even in this case, Greece was the first country 
to ask for this emergency support in 2011.
Additionally, two other tools may be activated, more strictly dependent on the political 
will of  other Member States: voluntary relocation schemes, such as the one called Eurema, 
launched in 2009-2012 in favour of  Malta, concerning around 600 refugees (twelve Member 
States and three third states agreed to relocate refugees disembarked at Malta)25; temporary 
protection under Directive 2001/55, never enforced.
In practice, the state whose ship is conducting a SAR operation or the state responsible 
for the relevant SAR region, on accepting disembarkation, may be compelled by EU law to face 
the consequent burden (asylum seekers and refugees to accommodate; processing of  asylum 
claims; irregular migrants to manage and eventually return to origin or transit countries). 
While some help in managing the situation on the ground may be obtained through the four 
tools listed above, the perspective of  obtaining more robust solidarity (a relocation voluntary 
scheme, or the activation of  the mechanisms regulated in Directive 2001/55) is conditioned 
by contingent and political aspects. Such a situation created some reluctance in Member States 
with regard to participation in Frontex operations with their official ships (preferring, in the 
case of  participation, to deploy helicopters, airplanes or other facilities) or to the hosting of  
the operation itself.
25 See the press release of 12 May 2011, at <http://ec.europa.eu/malta/news/over_300_refugees_resettled_
en.htm>; the Statement by Cecilia Malmström, EU Commissioner in charge of Home Affairs, on the results of 
the Ministerial Pledging Conference (12 May 2011), Doc. MEMO/11/295 of 13 May 2011; European Asylum 
Support Office, EUREMA Fact Finding Report on Intra-EU Relocation Activities From Malta, July 2012, at 
<http://easo.europa.eu/wp-content/uploads/EUREMA-fact-finding-report-EASO1.pdf>; the FRA study, pp. 112-
113.
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In 2010, the EU Council approved the Decision No. 2010/252 of  26 April 2010, 
supplementing the Schengen Borders Code as regards the surveillance of  the sea external 
borders in the context of  operational cooperation coordinated by Frontex.26 This Decision 
contains guidelines only for the Frontex-led operations and not for activities carried out by 
Member States in their autonomy. Moreover, it is divided into two parts, one binding and 
one merely recommendatory. This being said, the Decision is an important tool of  reference 
for international practice. In the binding part, interesting clarifications are made on the 
extension of  coercive powers on ships without nationality and, especially, on the prohibition 
to disembark persons in places that may be unsafe from a non-refoulement perspective. In the 
recommendatory part, SAR matters are directly treated. In the following analysis the relevant 
part of  the Decision will be recalled.27
IV. CONTROVERSIAL ISSUES, WITH SPECIAL REGARD TO THE MEDITERRANEAN 
SEA
When examining the actual degree of  implementation of  the international rules on the 
safety of  life at sea, a first problematic issue that we see is the fragmentary state of  affairs 
as far as the drafting of  regional or bilateral treaties on the delimitation of  SAR areas is 
concerned. Focusing on the Mediterranean Basin, a provisional plan was adopted by IMO 
in the 1997 Conference of  Valencia, as a framework of  reference for the Mediterranean Sea 
and the Black Sea, open to additional specification at state’s level and to integration by means 
of  more detailed bilateral and regional agreements.28 Unfortunately, the discussions carried 
out in Valencia among the states of  Central Mediterranean (absent Algeria and Libya) were 
unfruitful, and did not allow to reach a consensus. In particular, the area delimited by the 
coasts of  Italy, Malta and Libya raises various problems. Both Malta29 and Italy30 unilaterally 
26 OJ 2010 L 111/20.
27 It must be added that the EU Court of Justice declared the invalidity of this decision, owing to procedural 
faults: Court of Justice (Grand Chamber), Judgment of 5 September 2012 case C-355/10, European Parliament v. 
Council of the European Union, not yet published. The judgment of the Court does not contest the substance per 
se of the Decision, but only the procedure followed to enact rules, which require political choices falling within 
the responsibilities of the EU legislature. Additionally, the effects of the contested decision are maintained until 
the entry into force, within a reasonable time, of new rules intended to replace the annulled decision. In Spring 
2013, the European Commission presented a proposal for a new regulation, to be adopted with the legislative 
procedure: see Doc. COM (2013) 197 final, 12 April 2013, § 3.4. Where containing elements of interest, also the 
proposal will be quoted.
28 See the ‘General Agreement on a Provisional SAR Plan’, adopted during the IMO Conference held in 
Valencia (8-12 September 1997), as Ann. 1 to the Res. 1.
29 See the map and the information reported at <www.sarmalta.gov.mt/sar_in_Malta.htm> and in IMO Circular 
SAR.8/Circ.1/Corr.3, 20 October 2005, Global Sar Plan Containing Information on the Current Availability of 
Sar Services, Ann. 2 <www.imo.org/includes/blastDataOnly.asp/data_id%3D16608/1-Corr-3.pdf>, p. 25.
30 See the map annexed to Presidential Decree (D.P.R.) No. 660/1994 and in IMO Circular SAR.8/Circ.1/
Corr.5, 23 April 2007, Global Sar Plan Containing Information on the Current Availability of Sar Services <www.
imo.org/includes/blastDataOnly.asp/data_id%3D18744/1-Corr-5.pdf>, p. 26.
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established SAR zones, partially overlapping. The extension of  the Maltese SAR area appears 
to be excessive, paying due regard to the country’s capacity to warrant adequate coverage 
and to the circumstance that it includes the Italian islands of  Lampedusa and Lampione 
and the surrounding territorial waters.31 As far as Libya is concerned, it is not sure that a 
formal establishment of  the SAR followed the adhesion to the SAR Convention.32 It should 
be noted, however, that in the past the Maltese government often referred to the Libyan 
SAR area when dealing with distress situations involving disembarkation issues of  migrants 
rescued there; moreover, on 18 March 2009, Libya and Malta signed a “Memorandum of  
Understanding (MoU) in the field of  search and rescue,” aimed at coordinating the search and 
rescue operations within their respective SAR regions.33 In any case, it is certain that during 
the last few years, the issues of  the unsatisfactory fulfilment of  search and rescue and of  the 
insufficient cooperation with other states involved in SAR operations in the waters included in 
the Libyan SAR region or otherwise proximate have often been raised.34
The above-mentioned difficulties are not shared by any part of  the Mediterranean Basin. 
31 It has been reported that “The reasons for this enormous SAR area are historical and are also connected to 
the lucrative income Malta derives from its Flight Information Region (FIR). The size of the SAR region is bound 
to the Maltese FIR. Malta is earning around €8.23 million yearly for air traffic passing over its SAR/FIR region”: 
see KLEPP, S., ‘A Double Bind: Malta and the Rescue of Unwanted Migrants at Sea, a Legal Anthropological 
Perspective on the Humanitarian Law of the Sea’, International Journal of Refugee Law, Vol. 23, 2011, p. 538, 
at p. 545.
The anomalies of the Malta SAR zone may be addressed only following the conclusion of dedicated delimitation 
and cooperation agreements with neighbouring countries. With Greece, an Agreement on Cooperation in the Field 
of Search and Rescue was signed on 12 January 2008 (and ratified by Malta on 3 April 2008) but has not yet 
entered into force; see <www.foreign.gov.mt/TreatyDetails.aspx?id=583>: it delegates to Greek authorities the 
coordination of SAR activities over a broad portion of the eastern Maltese SAR region.
As far Italy is concerned, some rounds of negotiation in recent years did not produce a decisive outcome. 
As reported by the then legal advisor of Italy (Professor Umberto Leanza), in September 1999 a substantive 
understanding had been reached on a draft framework agreement, under whose terms subsequent technical 
arrangements on specific items (SAR matters among others) would have been concluded between the parties. In 
2002 the framework agreement reached the stage of signature, but contrasts arose as to the possible content of 
related technical arrangements: see ‘Framework Agreement for Aero-maritime Surveillance in the Mediterranean 
for the Fight Against Illegal Trafficking at Sea, With Particular Reference to Those Activities Which Directly 
Cause Harm to Customs and Revenue’, signed on 20 December 2002, entered into force on 31 July 2003; for 
the text, see <www.foreign.gov.mt/TreatyDownloader.aspx?id=255>. A new round of negotiations took place 
between 2002 and 2005, but apparently no technical arrangements were finalized. For additional details, see 
LEANZA, U., ‘Maritime Safety and Security Within Mediterranean Context: Strategic Outlines’, reprinted in the 
proceedings of the 1st Mediterranean Coast Guard Services Forum, held in Genoa on 6-7 May 2009, at <www.
guardiacostiera.it/medforum/agenda.cfm>, p. 12.
32 See the Commission Working Document, qtd. at p. 5, note 4; Leanza 2009, p. 11. Besides, the relevant IMO 
Circulars on Global Sar Plan Containing Information on the Current Availability of Sar Services do not report any 
information regarding Libya SAR zone and services, notwithstanding Libya’s quality of contracting States of the 
SAR Convention: lastly, see Doc. SAR.8/Circ.4, 1 December 2012. Libya formally accessed the SAR Convention 
in 2005, and the SOLAS Convention in 1981.
33 See <www.mfa.gov.mt/default.aspx?MDIS=21&NWID=322>.The text is not made public and no 
information on its status is available on the Maltese MFA website.
34 See the Commission Working Document, qtd. at p. 5 and p. 33, where it is stated that “the waters neighbouring 
Libya are not subject to SAR patrols” and that there are still some areas where SAR services are not provided at 
the moment by the State mainly responsible (for instance in the waters around Libya). See also the FRA study, 
pp. 32-33.
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In fact, it may be recalled that in the Ionic and Adriatic seas a consensus was found during the 
talks in Valencia and that some years later (2000) a treaty-based regime, rather satisfactory, was 
defined by the interested states.35
A second problematic issue is represented by the notion of  distress. It may be wondered 
whether it embraces a self-induced situation of  danger (in order to claim rescue by the 
authorities of  a prospective destination country) or the commencement of  a risky voyage 
on an unseaworthy vessel. Contrary to what has been suggested by a commentator,36 I share 
the view that distress is an objective situation, which calls for rescue by ships that are able 
to intervene, irrespective of  the genesis of  it.37 Rather than exempting from rescue duties, 
such a scenario might lead to consequences of  another kind : interested states could impose 
sanctions on smugglers (when identifiable) and prevent or interrupt risky voyages even just 
outside the harbours of  the departure country and in the adjacent waters: in such cases, these 
reactions might well be deemed legitimate restrictions on the right to leave a country, under 
Article 12, paragraph 3 of  the 1966 UN International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights 
and under Article 2, paragraph 3 of  the 4th Additional Protocol to the ECHR.38
A third question arises with the same concept of  rescue. Does it imply taking on board 
the persons in danger, or escorting their vessel to a safe harbour? Or would it be sufficient 
to merely provide water, food, basic sanitary assistance and fuel and allow the vessel to 
continue its journey when it is self-evident that an attempt of  irregular entry into another 
state’s territory will be realized? Sometimes, the latter interpretation has been advanced as a 
justification for not interfering with the ‘sacred’ freedom of  navigation, especially when the 
migrants reportedly expressed the will to continue the journey.39 If  it is clear beyond all doubt 
that any situation requires an ad hoc evaluation, in general terms, however, it must be stressed 
that freedom of  navigation is accorded only to vessels that fulfil a set of  requisites, including 
35 During the Ancona Conference of 19 May 2000, Italy concluded several Memoranda of Understanding 
with Albania, Croatia, Greece, and Slovenia: see GESTRI, M., ‘I rapporti di vicinato marittimo tra l’Italia e 
gli Stati nati dalla dissoluzione della Iugoslavia’, in RONZITTI, N. (Ed.), I rapporti di vicinato dell’Italia con 
Croazia, Serbia-Montenegro e Slovenia, Luiss University Press-Giuffré, Rome-Milan, 2005, p. 177, at pp. 207-
211; TASSI, A., ‘Le zone di ricerca e soccorso in Mediterraneo’, Rivista Marittima, Vol. 146, No. 4, 2007, p. 31, 
at p. 33.
As for other parts of the Mediterranean Sea, a critical issue is represented by the delimitation of SAR zones 
between Greece and Turkey: on this subject, see TREVISANUT, S., ‘Search and Rescue Operations in the 
Mediterranean: Factor of Cooperation or Conflict?’, The International Journal of Marine and Coastal Law, Vol. 
25, 2010, p. 523, at pp. 532-534; MARINAI, S., ‘The Action of Greece and Spain Against Irregular Migration by 
Sea’, in DEL VECCHIO, A. (ed.), loc. cit., §2.10 (therein additional references).
36 See PUGH, M., ‘Europe’s Boat People: Maritime Cooperation in the Mediterranean’, Chaillot Paper No. 
41, July 2000, p. 57.
37 See MALLIA,  P., loc. cit., p. 98.
38 This being said, it must be underlined that other aspects might arise, under a human rights’ perspective: see 
below, in the text.
39 See the references to Maltese practice made by CAFFIO, F., ‘Un accordo euromediterraneo per il salvataggio 
dei migranti’, Affari internazionali, 6 June 2011 <www.affarinternazionali.it/articolo.asp?ID=1776>; KLEPP, S., 
loc. cit., pp. 552-554 and p. 557; FRA study, p. 34.
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that of  being registered under a state’s flag, showing its flag, satisfying minimum requisites 
of  safety and seaworthiness and being manned by a duly trained commander and crew. Thus, 
absent such requirements, the rescuing unit should prefer an interpretation of  its duties based 
upon good faith and the assumption of  responsibility rather than on the hope that migrants 
will sail towards another state’s shores. Moreover, when two EU Member States are involved, 
the duty of  solidarity (spelled in Article 4, paragraph 3 TEU and Article 80 TFEU) is hardly 
compatible with a ‘turn away the eyes’ policy by the intervening unit.
Fourthly, maritime law requires delivery of  rescued persons as soon as possible to a place 
of  safety, which is defined as a location where rescue operations are considered to terminate, 
and where the survivors’ safety or life is no longer threatened, basic human needs (such as 
food, shelter and medical needs) can be met and transportation arrangements can be made for 
the survivors’ next or final destination.40 A restrictive interpretation of  the notion might lead to 
the consideration that a port of  any country where such basic needs are satisfied would match 
the requirements of  a place of  safety, irrespective of  the quality of  the rescued persons and of  
the possible need for international protection.41 However, a wider construction of  the concept 
of  place of  safety is advanced by many commentators,42 having due regard to converging 
data of  international practice (IMO Guidelines,43 United Nations High Commissioner for 
Refugees-UNHCR positions,44 EU orientations45): a location is safe when no risk of  refoulement 
40 See IMO Guidelines on the Treatment of Persons Rescued at Sea, Doc. MSC.167(78), 20 May 2005, 
Principle 6.12.
41 This seems to be the position of Maltese authorities, according to KLEPP, S., loc. cit., pp. 549-550.
42 See WEINZIERL, R., LISSON, U., loc. cit.; TREVISANUT, S.,‘The Principle of Non-Refoulement at Sea 
and the Effectiveness of Asylum Protection’, Max Planck Yearbook of United Nations Law, Vol. 12, 2008, p. 205; 
FISCHER-LESCANO, A., LÖHR, T., TOHIDIPUR, T., loc. cit., p. 291; WOUTERS, K., DEN HEIJER, M., ‘The 
Marine I Case: A Comment’, International Journal of Refugee Law, Vol. 22, 2010, p. 1; MORENO-LAX, V., loc. 
cit., pp. 199-200; TONDINI, M., ‘The Legality of the Interception of Boat People Under Search and Rescue and 
Border Control Operations’, Journal of International Maritime Law, Vol. 18, 2012, p. 59, at pp. 63-65.
43 For this view, see the Principle 6.17 contained in the IMO Guidelines on the Treatment of Persons Rescued 
at Sea: “The need to avoid disembarkation in territories where the lives and freedoms of those alleging a well-
founded fear of persecution would be threatened is a consideration in the case of asylum-seekers and refugees 
recovered at sea. / La nécessité d’éviter le débarquement dans des territoires où la vie et la liberté des personnes 
qui affirment avoir des craintes bien fondées de persécution seraient menacées est à prendre en compte dans le 
cas de demandeurs d’asile et de réfugiés récupérés en mer” (emphasis added).
44 See IMO & UNHCR, Rescue at Sea. A Guide to Principles and Practice as Applied to Migrants and 
Refugees, qtd. at pp. 7-10; UNHCR, Background Paper for the Expert Meeting in Djibouti (8-10 November 
2011). Refugees and Asylum-Seekers in Distress at Sea – How Best to Respond?, October 2011, qtd. at Ann. A, 
§ III.2, p. 7.
45 Council Decision 2010/252 of 26 April 2010. In Part I of the Decision (of a binding nature), § 1.2 reads 
as follows: “No person shall be disembarked in, or otherwise handed over to the authorities of, a country in 
contravention of the principle of non-refoulement, or from which there is a risk of expulsion or return to another 
country in contravention of that principle. Without prejudice to paragraph 1.1, the persons intercepted or rescued 
shall be informed in an appropriate way so that they can express any reasons for believing that disembarkation 
in the proposed place would be in breach of the principle of non-refoulement”. In even stricter terms, see the 
proposal for a new regulation, replacing such decision and contained in Doc. COM (2013) 197, qtd., under Article 
4.
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arises and where basic human rights of  migrants and asylum seekers are respected. 46 As a 
consequence, depending on the presence of  asylum seekers or other vulnerable persons on 
the vessel in distress, “the arrangements made in regard to some of  those rescued may not be 
valid for others.”47
This clarification is even more important as far as flagless vessels are concerned. For a 
public ship engaged in controls over irregular migration, a SAR intervention and the subsequent 
transportation of  migrants to a port may appear as an easy way to assert jurisdiction on persons 
and boats, even where doubt might be raised about their exact journey, their behaviour and 
the prospective final destination. Asserting a situation of  distress allows one to immediately 
intervene and then to disembark persons, in a national port48 or in the port of  a third country 
(for instance, the departure one, or a transit one) that has expressed its consent, mainly in the 
context of  a bilateral cooperation agreement on combating irregular migration by sea. Should 
the place of  safety be meant to be just a shelter from sinking and starving, serious deficits as 
to the protection of  human rights and respect of  the non-refoulement principle might arise.
Last, but not least, the actual identification of  the place of  disembarkation put the SAR 
system under high pressure. Which state must allow disembarkation of  the rescued persons 
46 On the strictly related issue of the extraterritorial application of human rights law and of the principle of non 
refoulement, see the authors cited in note 12. For its relevance, here a reference must be made to ECtHR (Grand 
Chamber), Judgment of 23 February 2012, Application No. 27765/09, Hirsi Jamaa and others v. Italy. This 
landmark judgment has been object of several comments, given that it asserted the contrariness to Article 3 of the 
ECHR (prohibiting torture and inhuman and degrading treatments) and to Article 4 of the Fourth Protocol to the 
ECHR (prohibiting collective expulsions) of the Italian practice of push-back to Libya of ships intercepted mainly 
in the high seas on their prospective route to Italy or to other European shores: see, among others, CARELLA, 
G., ‘Il divieto di respingimenti in mare, il caso Hirsi Jamaa e l’isola che non c’è’, Sud in Europa, 2012, No. 
1, p. 5; CALLAMARE, G., ‘La sentenza Hirsi Jamaa e la “nuova fase di cooperazione” tra Italia e Libia nel 
settore migratorio’, Sud in Europa, No. 2, 2012, p. 3; GIUFFRÉ, M., ‘State Responsibility Beyond Borders: 
What Legal Basis for Italy’s Push-backs to Libya?’, International Journal of Refugee Law, Vol. 24, 2012, p. 692; 
LIGUORI, A., ‘La Corte europea dei diritti dell’uomo condanna l’Italia per i respingimenti verso la Libia del 
2009: il caso Hirsi’, Rivista di Diritto Internazionale, Vol. 95, 2012, p. 415; NAPOLETANO, N., ‘La condanna 
dei “respingimenti” operati dall’Italia verso la Libia da parte della Corte europea dei diritti umani: molte luci 
e qualche ombra’, Diritti umani e diritto internazionale, Vol. 6, 2012, p. 436; NASCIMBENE, B., ‘Condanna 
senza appello per i «respingimenti»’, Affari internazionali, 10 March 2012 (at <http://www.affarinternazionali.
it/articolo.asp?ID=1988>); TONDINI, M., ‘The legality of intercepting boat people under search and rescue and 
border control operations with reference to recent Italian interventions in the Mediterranean Sea and the ECtHR 
decision in the Hirsi case’, Journal of International Maritime Law, Vol. 18, 2012, p. 59. 
More recently, some debate was provoked by the decision taken in early August 2013 by Italian and Maltese 
authorities to order two private rescuing units to take the migrants to Libyan port of Tripoli: see FRENZEN, N., 
Italy Conducted De Facto Push-Back of Migrants By Ordering Cargo Ship to Rescue and Transport Migrants to 
Libya, 13 August 2013, at <http://migrantsatsea.wordpress.com/2013/08/13/italy-conducted-de-facto-push-back-
of-migrants-by-ordering-cargo-ship-to-rescue-and-transport-migrants-to-libya>. See also M. Dalli, ‘Government 
warns Salamis’s local agent to take migrants back to Tripoli’, Malta Today, 5 August 2013 (at <http://www.
maltatoday.com.mt/en/newsdetails/news/national/Government-warns-Salamis-local-agent-migrants-must-be-
taken-back-to-Tripoli-20130805>, reproducing the text of the letter sent by Maltese authorities to the local agent 
for the rescuing unit Salamis); F. Caffio, ‘Nodi irrisolti nel Mediterraneo dei migranti’, Affari internazionali, 12 
August 2013, at <http://www.affarinternazionali.it/articolo.asp?ID=2388>.
47 See MORENO-LAX, V., loc. cit., p. 198.
48 Thus avoiding lengthy and costly activities of surveillance over the vessel concerned: once disembarked, 
rescued persons might be, depending on the circumstances, removed to origin or transit countries.
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after the first emergency intervention? The generic reference often made to the ‘next port 
of  call’ in some writings or in UNHCR statements is devoid of  a precise legal meaning and 
is absent from international maritime law treaties.49 At the same time, such treaties do not 
identify a precise responsibility to accept rescued persons for any state. Generally speaking, 
several states, having links with the situation, may be deemed potentially interested for 
disembarkation: the flag state of  the rescuing unit or of  the vessel in distress; the next port 
of  call on the rescuing ship’s planned route; the closest port to the place where the rescue 
occurred; the state from which the vessel took the sea; the state competent for the relevant 
SAR zone; the countries of  nationality of  those rescued.
The problems are particularly serious for rescuing private ships, which may be subjected 
to economic losses and complications, given that it is not always easy to prosecute the original 
route. Practice shows that a rescue at sea by private vessels may be followed by a refusal 
of  the nearest state or the state territorially competent for the relevant SAR zone to accept 
the disembarkation of  the migrants,50 or by the master having difficulty in convincing such 
authorities of  not being involved in smuggling of  migrants.51 Sometimes, the mess is total, as 
the case concerning the Maltese fishing boat Budafel shows.52 For public ships, inconveniences 
are not any lesser, leading to situations where the only accessible solution may be represented 
49 As to possible meanings, depending on the actual situation, see UNHCR, Background Note on the Protection 
of Asylum-Seekers and Refugees Rescued at Sea, 18 March 2002, § 30.1: the Note was discussed at the expert 
round table ‘Rescue-at-Sea: Specific Aspects Relating to the Protection of Asylum-Seekers and Refugees’, held 
in Lisbon, Portugal on 25-26 March 2002.
50 See the famous case of the Norwegian boat ‘Tampa’, occurred in 2001, on which see FORNANI, M.N., 
‘Soccorso in mare di profughi e diritto di asilo: questioni di diritto internazionale sollevate dalle vicende della 
nave Tampa’, La Comunità Internazionale, Vol. 57, 2002, p. 61; MATHEW, P., ‘Australian Refugee Protection in 
the Wake of the Tampa’, American Journal of International Law, Vol. 96, 2002, p. 661; WHITE, M., ‘M/V Tampa 
Incident and Shipping Obligations of a Coastal State’, Indian Journal of International Law, Vol. 44, 2003, p. 314. 
More recently, similar cases took place in the waters between Malta and Libya, involving Spanish fishing boats 
(‘Francisco Catilina’ in July 2006; ‘Monfalcó’ in May 2007) not allowed to disembark either in Malta or in Libya, 
migrants rescued in a situation of clear distress: some days later, migrants were accepted by Spain and other 
European countries (see UNHCR, Press Briefing, 1 June 2007; El Pais, 4 June 2007). For further details on other 
cases, see MILTNER, B., ‘Irregular Maritime Migration: Refugee Protection Issues in Rescue and Interception’, 
Fordham International Law Journal, Vol. 30, 2006, p. 75, at pp. 87-89; COPPENS, J., SOMERS, E., ‘Towards 
New Rules on Disembarkation of Persons Rescued at Sea?’, The International Journal of Marine and Coastal 
Law, Vol. 25, 2010, p. 377, at pp. 379-381; MARINAI, S., loc. cit., 2013, § 2.10.
51 See the Cap Anamur case (2004) and the indictment of some Tunisian fishermen (2007), both concerning 
Italy. For some interesting comments, TREVISANUT, S. ‘Le Cap Anamur: profils de droit international et de 
droit de la mer’, Annuaire du Droit de la Mer, 2004, Vol. 9, p. 49; DI PASCALE, A., ‘Migration Control at Sea: 
The Italian Case’, in RYAN, B., MITSILEGAS, V. (Eds.), Extraterritorial Migration Control: Legal Challenges, 
Martinus Nijhoff, Leiden, 2010,  p. 281, at pp. 302-304. On 7 October 2009 the Tribunal of Agrigento acquitted 
the convicted persons of their charges in the Cap Anamur trial. Similarly, on 21 September 2011 the Court of 
Appeal of Palermo acquitted the Tunisian fishermen of the charge of smuggling of migrants and of disobedience 
towards public authorities.
52 See the account given by various sources: UNHCR, Press Briefing, 1 June 2007; La Repubblica, 27 
May 2007 and 29 May 2007; the report from the Italian NGO Consiglio italiano rifugiati, presented during 
an EP public hearing <www.europarl.europa.eu/hearings/20070703/libe/cir_report_en.pdf>; the version from 
the Maltese government, included in a document presented in the same hearing <www.europarl.europa.eu/
hearings/20070703/libe/caruana_en.pdf>; COPPENS, J., SOMERS, E., loc. cit., p. 380.
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by their own ports.53
In order to solve such problems and avoid the risk that commercial ships refrain from 
providing the due rescue or that warships have no other choice, due to diplomatic disagreement 
with the nearest states, than to conduct the migrants towards their own coasts, IMO adopted in 
2004 some amendments to SOLAS and SAR Conventions, aimed at strengthening the search 
and rescue system and minimizing the inconveniences for ships carrying out an intervention.54
Article 4.1-1 SOLAS, as amended, states that:
“Contracting Governments shall co-ordinate and co-operate to ensure that masters of  
ships providing assistance by embarking persons in distress at sea are released from their 
obligations with minimum further deviation from the ships’ intended voyage, provided that 
releasing the master of  the ship from the obligations under the current regulation does 
not further endanger the safety of  life at sea. The Contracting Government responsible 
for the search and rescue region in which such assistance is rendered shall exercise primary 
responsibility for ensuring such co-ordination and co-operation occurs, so that survivors 
assisted are disembarked from the assisting ship and delivered to a place of  safety, taking into 
account the particular circumstances of  the case and guidelines developed by the Organization. 
In these cases the relevant Contracting Governments shall arrange for such disembarkation to 
be effective as soon as reasonably practicable”.
Article 3.1.9 SAR, as amended, is drafted in almost identical terms.55 Such amendments 
entered into force on 1 July 2006, according to the simplified revision mechanism of  the 
mentioned conventions.
Problems have not disappeared, however: a relevant state like Malta did not accept 
the amendments, thus not being bound by them. Moreover, even under the amendments 
mentioned, the state responsible for the relevant SAR region does not seem to be under an 
unconditional duty to receive rescued persons: arguments have been put forward by some 
scholars in order to claim such duty in the event that no other state shows willingness to 
53 See the serious deficiencies in the behaviour of several military ships, emerged in the so called Strik Report: 
Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe 2012, qtd. at §§ 141-149; Parliamentary Assembly of the 
Council of Europe, Res. 1872 (2012), 24 April 2012.
54 See IMO Maritime Safety Committee Resolutions MSC.153(78) and MSC.155(78), adopted on 20 May 
2004.
55 “Parties shall co-ordinate and co-operate to ensure that masters of ships providing assistance by embarking 
persons in distress at sea are released from their obligations with minimum further deviation from the ships’ 
intended voyage, provided that releasing the master of the ship from the obligations does not further endanger 
the safety of life at sea. The Party responsible for the search and rescue region in which such assistance is 
rendered shall exercise primary responsibility for ensuring such co-ordination and cooperation occurs, so that 
survivors assisted are disembarked from the assisting ship and delivered to a place of safety, taking into account 
the particular circumstances of the case and guidelines developed by the Organization. In these cases, the relevant 
Parties shall arrange for such disembarkation to be effective as soon as reasonably practicable.”
The IMO Guidelines on the treatment of persons rescued at sea, adopted by Committee on Maritime Safety 
together with the mentioned amendments by Resolution MSC.167(78), defines place a safety a location where 
rescue operations are considered to terminate and that an assisting ship could only temporarily considered a place 
of safety (see §§ 6.12-6.14).
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accept disembarkation,56 but it must be admitted that the language of  the 2004 amendments 
is carefully drafted in order to avoid any automatism57 and that it was chosen after lengthy and 
complex discussions in IMO quarters.58
It follows that this state of  the art in international legislation must be read in conjunction 
with different interpretations of  the SAR Convention by proximate Mediterranean countries. 
While Malta (which not by chance refused to accept the 2004 amendments) maintains that 
rescued persons must be disembarked at the closest safe port (usually at Lampedusa or in 
Sicily),59 Italy replies that unless a different arrangement is reached on a case-by-case basis, the 
state competent for the relevant SAR zone must allow the disembarkation: given the extension 
of  the Maltese SAR area, this would mean La Valletta’s port in the majority of  cases. The 
dispute between these two countries – exacerbated by the subsequent duties to take charge of  
asylums seekers and of  repatriation of  migrants, absent a comprehensive and automatic EU-
based mechanism of  burden sharing – periodically produces relevant deadlocks, as illustrated 
by the following recent cases: the merchant ship Pinar (flying Panama’s flag and whose owner 
had Turkish nationality), having rescued some migrants in Maltese SAR waters, was forced 
to wait for four days in the high seas, before being allowed by Italian authorities to approach 
Italian shores60; the Italian frigate Spica61 and the patrol boat Commander Borsini,62 which 
56 See TREVISANUT, S., loc. cit., 2010, p. 530. According to GAMMELTOFT-HANSEN, T., The Refugee, 
the Sovereign and the Sea: EU Interdiction Policies in the Mediterranean, DIIS Working Paper No. 2008/6, at pp. 
25-27, the 2004 amendments oblige the State responsible for the relevant SAR zone to allow disembarkation. A 
similar stand seems proposed in the House of Lords European Union Committee’s Ninth Report on the European 
Union, devoted to Frontex, 2008, § 109. A more nuanced position is expressed by WEINZIERL, R., LISSON, U., 
loc. cit., p. 40 (with further references).
57 The language employed in the amendments would have been different if a strict duty to receive rescued 
persons were to be placed upon the said State. The failure to stipulate a precise State of disembarkation is not 
judged a defect per se by COPPENS, J., SOMERS, E., loc. cit., pp. 387-388, due to the need to take into account 
multiple factors in each situation, not least the different need of migrants in a context of mixed flows.
58 For this view, see amongst others MALLIA, P., loc. cit., pp. 135-140; BARNES, R., loc. cit., pp. 139 and 
142. See also UNHCR, Background Paper for the Expert Meeting in Djibouti, p. 3, n. 7.
59 This was underlined by the Maltese Government with regard to some incidents occurring in the Libyan 
SAR region: see the letter of 8 June 2007 of the Malta Permanent Representative to the EU, addressed to the 
German Permanent Representative to the EU, in his capacity as Chairman of CoRePer, available at <www.
europarl.europa.eu/hearings/20070703/libe/caruana_en.pdf>; the statement of the Maltese Minister for justice 
and home affairs, delivered at the JHA Council meeting of 12 June 2007, available at <www.doi.gov.mt/en/
press_releases/2007/06/pr0870.asp>.
60 As Italian authorities clearly stated, Italy permitted disembarkation solely in view of the serious humanitarian 
emergency occurred on board of the merchant ship, and this gesture must not be interpreted as a precedent, nor as 
a recognition of the reasons put forward by Malta in the subject-matter: see the joint press release of the Ministers 
of Foreign Affairs and of Home Affairs of 19 April 2009 <www.esteri.it/MAE/IT/Sala_Stampa/ArchivioNotizie/
Comunicati/2009/04/20090420_FrattiniMaroni_navePinar.htm?LANG=IT>. The Maltese Prime Minister, in a 
declaration released to his Parliament on 21 April 2009, underlined that the rescue occurred 41 nautical miles 
from Lampedusa and 114 nautical miles to the South West of Malta, thus rendering Italy the State responsible for 
accepting disembarkation <www.mfa.gov.mt/default.aspx?MDIS=21&NWID=360>. See also the conclusions 
of the Maltese Council of Ministers of 5 May 2009 <www.mfa.gov.mt/Default.aspx?MDIS=21&NWID=378>.
61 The facts occurred between 10 and 11 May 2009: see <www.timesofmalta.com/articles/view/20090511/
local/malta-rejects-new-italian-request-to-take-migrants>.
62 The facts occurred between 13 and 14 August 2011: see <www.timesofmalta.com/articles/view/20110815/
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unsuccessfully tried to access La Valletta’s port after having rescued a group of  migrants 
in Maltese SAR waters and was later obliged to sail towards Port Empedocle in Sicily; the 
Liberian-flagged oil tanker Salamis, which refused to take to Libya the rescued migrants and – 
after having tried to disembark them to its next port of  call (La Valletta) and having received 
a strict refusal by Maltese authorities – was allowed to enter an Italian port on humanitarian 
grounds.63
This Italian–Maltese saga registered additional worrying developments. Following the 
occurrence of  serious disorders in Lampedusa in the aftermath of  the so-called Arab Springs, 
on 24 September 2011, the Italian authorities declared the island to be an ‘unsafe port’ under 
SAR Convention and related provisions,64 realizing a sort of  ‘excision strategy’ of  the small 
island in the context of  the controversial issue of  the place of  disembarkation65 and of  the 
related identification of  the closest safe port. On 1 October 2011, in a joint statement, UNHCR, 
IOM and Save the Children, part of  the Praesidium project,66 warned that this decision would 
endanger rescue operations with coast guards unable to dock in Lampedusa, requiring them to 
travel further (supposedly up to Sicilian coasts or to Malta) to bring those rescued.67 It must be 
admitted that the above-mentioned riots in Lampedusa (leading to the partial destruction of  
the centre of  first accommodation of  migrants, transformed into a sort of  detention centre 
without access to judges, lawyers and asylum procedures) broke out because of  the choice of  
the Italian authorities not to relocate in Sicily and on the mainland the thousands of  persons 
who gradually had arrived on the small island from Tunisia and Libya during the previous 
weeks: the accumulation of  persons in a precarious and uncertain situation on a small island 
(in a sort of  no-law context) created strong tension with the authorities and, subsequently, 
even with the inhabitants. All these facts are not dependent on an objective inability of  the 
Lampedusa island to receive persons rescued at sea, but are the consequences of  an ill-
conceived strategy of  avoidance of  responsibility by the Italian government in the context 
of  migratory fluxes originated by the political changes in Northern Africa. The situation of  
Lampedusa was still unclear at the end of  August 2013: rescued persons have been actually 
carried there by Italian public units following some SAR interventions on the high seas, but it 
seems that the declaration of  ‘unsafe port’ has not yet been officially revoked.
local/Malta-refuses-migrants-rescued-by-Italian-ship.380260>.
63 The facts occurred between 4 and 7 August 2013: see FRENZEN, N., op. cit.; <http://www.ilfattoquotidiano.
it/2013/08/07/immigrazione-litalia-accogliera-nave-alla-quale-malta-ha-rifiutato-lingresso-in/678815>.
64 See the information given by the Italian Government to the Chamber of Deputies on 28 September 2011, at 
<www.camera.it/410?idSeduta=0526&tipo=stenografico#sed0526.stenografico.tit00020>.
65 As a consequence, persons rescued at sea for whom Italy accepted responsibility were not brought to 
Lampedusa but to Sicily.
66 On this Project, see UNHCR, Refugee Protection and International Migration: A Review of UNHCR’s 
Operational Role in Southern Italy, Doc. PDES/2009/05, September 2009 <www.unhcr.org/4ac35c600.pdf>; the 
press release on the UNHCR website <www.unhcr.it/news/dir/168/praesidium.html>.
67 See <www.unhcr.it/news/dir/26/view/1068/lampedusa-dichiarata-porto-non-sicuro-a-rischio-il-salvataggio-
in-mare-preoccupazione-per-la-prassi-del-trattenimento-dei-migranti-su-navi-106800.html>.
69
Paix et Sécurité Internationales
Num. 1, janvier-décembre 2013
MARCELO DI FILIPPO
Thus, differences among interested states about the identification of  the place of  safety 
may postpone the disembarkation and act as a disincentive for potential rescuing units. The 
state responsible for the SAR region – as a consequence of  its inertia or of  a limited will to fulfil 
its duty to handle the situation, owing to objective difficulties or opportunity considerations 
– may discharge upon other states and the intervening ship the burdens following a SAR 
activity.68 Here we are faced with a mix of  legal and political issues: some years ago, it was 
rightly pointed out that the reluctance of  EU Member States to provide patrol boats in the 
joint operations coordinated by Frontex was due to the risk that the country providing the 
boats would have remained responsible for migrants rescued or intercepted at sea.69 Moreover, 
some ships might prefer not to fulfil their rescuing duties to avoid facing delays or costs arising 
from the uncertainties about disembarkation to a place of  safety.
V. THE FAILED ATTEMPT OF IMO AND EU TO ELABORATE NEW LEGAL STANDARDS
Owing to the uncertainties discussed in the previous section, some initiatives have been 
taken by IMO bodies to overcome the difficulties. The Facilitation Committee, responsible for 
the implementation and updating of  the Convention on Facilitation of  International Maritime 
Traffic (FAL Convention),70 discussed the topic and approved in 2009 some interpretative 
guidelines of  the 2005 amendments to the Convention, aimed at facilitating disembarkation 
of  persons rescued at sea. A circular, of  a recommendatory nature, containing “Principles 
relating to administrative procedures for disembarking persons rescued at sea” was adopted in 
January 2009, stating that
If  disembarkation from the rescuing ship cannot be arranged swiftly elsewhere, the 
Government responsible for the SAR area should accept the disembarkation of  the persons 
rescued in accordance with immigration laws and regulations of  each Member State into a place of  
safety under its control in which the persons rescued can have timely access to post rescue 
support.71
It is remarkable that several delegations opposed the use of  the mandatory word 
‘shall’ (originally present in the draft text) in recommendatory guidance, and accordingly the 
Committee agreed that ‘shall’ should be replaced by ‘should’, where it appeared.72 Besides, 
Japan (backed by many other states) required the insertion of  the phrase “in accordance with 
68 A similar perplexity is expressed by MILTNER, B., loc. cit., p. 109.
69 See LUTTERBECK, D., Coping With Europe’s Boat People. Trends and Policy Dilemmas in Controlling 
the EU’s Mediterranean Borders, ISPI Policy Brief No. 76 <www.ispionline.it/it/documents/PB_76_2008.pdf>, 
February 2008, p. 5.
70 Done at London, 9 April 1965, 115 Contracting States as of 31 January 2013.
71 See Facilitation Committee, Principles Relating to Administrative Procedures for Disembarking Persons 
Rescued at Sea, Doc. FAL.3/Circ.194, 22 January 2009, § 2.3 (emphasis added).
72 See Facilitation Committee, Report of the Facilitation Committee on Its Thirty-Fifth Session, Doc. FAL 
35/17, 19 March 2009, § 6.59.
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immigration laws and regulation”, thus further reducing the strength of  the indication therein 
spelled.73 It must also be emphasized that strong objections were raised by some important 
IMO Member States (such as Australia, Malta and Spain), pointing either at the lack of  
competence of  the FAL Committee on the subject matter74 or at the contrariness of  such 
guidance to a proper interpretation of  relevant provisions currently in force contained in the 
SAR and SOLAS Conventions as amended in 2004.75 In the light of  the foregoing, it seems 
that this circular left the situation of  uncertainty substantially unchanged.
In the same period, when the FAL Committee worked on the above-mentioned circular, 
in the framework of  the activities of  another IMO body, the Flag State Implementation (FSI) 
Sub-Committee, Spain and Italy jointly submitted a document76 proposing to adopt further 
amendments to SOLAS and SAR Conventions, in order to incorporate and even strengthen 
the solution put forward in the FAL Circular77 and thus to cast away any doubt about the 
identification of  the state responsible for the disembarkation of  the rescued individuals. Malta 
replied with articulate reasoning, claiming that already the 2004 amendments were excessively 
burdensome for the contracting state responsible for the relevant SAR region and that the 
right solution was for disembarkation to occur in the safe port closest to the location of  the 
rescue.78 After a lengthy discussion, the FSI sub-committee recognized that the substance of  
the questions raised by Italy and Spain required an appropriate discussion in other IMO fora 
(the MSC [Maritime Safety Committee] and the COMSAR Sub-Committee).79 During the 
discussion in the COMSAR Sub-Committee held in March 2010, a wide majority of  states 
did not support Italy and Spain’s proposal to elaborate new amendments to SOLAS and SAR 
Conventions, emphasizing the satisfactory point of  balance reached by the 2004 amendments 
and the need to solve outstanding problems in the context of  the flexibility therein envisaged, 
thus calling for the conclusion among interested parties of  dedicated regional or bilateral 
73 Ibid., § 6.58.
74 See Facilitation Committee, Report of the Facilitation Committee, qtd. at Ann. IV (Spain).
75 Ibid., qtd. at p. 32, Ann. V (Australia), Ann. VI (Malta).
76 See Doc. FSI/17/15/1, 13 February 2009, Compulsory Guidelines for the Treatment of Persons Rescued at 
Sea.
77 See the quoted document, § 10. The proposed text of the amendment reads as follow: “The Contracting 
Government responsible for the search and rescue region, where the rescue operation takes place, shall exercise 
primary responsibility for ensuring that such coordination and co-operation occurs, so that the persons rescued 
at sea are disembarked from the vessel involved in the rescued operation and delivered to a place of safety under 
its control, where persons rescued at sea can have timely access to post rescue support” (emphasis added).
78 See Doc. FSI 17/17/2, 27 February 2009, Comments on document 17/15/1, especially §§ 14-16. It has been 
rightly observed that the Maltese position, though following a shareable approach in principle, appears to be 
pushed by its peculiar overreaching SAR zone, whose extension should instead be delimited according to the 
actual capacity of the concerned country to fulfil the correlated international obligations: see Trevisanut 2010, 
p. 532.
79 See Doc. FSI 17/20, 24 April 2009, Report to the Maritime Safety Committee and the Marine Environment 
Protection Committee, especially §§ 15.10-15.12 (note that some delegations expressed their support to the 
proposal put forward by Italy and Spain).
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agreements.80
While in IMO the discussions were lively, even EU institutions were working on the 
subject of  maritime operations and SAR events: as already mentioned, the EU Council 
adopted the Decision No. 2010/252, containing rules (in Part I) and recommendations (in 
Part II) supplementing the Schengen Borders Code as regards the surveillance of  the sea 
external borders in the context of  operational cooperation coordinated by Frontex. It must be 
taken into account that in any Frontex operation at sea, one Member State acts as host country. 
According to the recommendatory guidelines, the participating unit should forward as soon as 
possible all available information to the Rescue Coordination Centre responsible for the search 
and rescue region where the situation is taking place. In cases where the Rescue Coordination 
Centre of  the third country responsible for the search and rescue region does not respond to 
the notification transmitted by the participating unit (as often occurred with Libya), the latter 
should contact the Rescue Coordination Centre of  the host Member State.81 This solution 
has the merit of  singling out a responsible authority in case of  lack of  cooperation by the 
competent third state, avoiding dangerous (negative) conflicts of  competence among Member 
States.
Additionally, the recommendatory guidelines tackle the contentious issue of  the place of  
disembarkation:
Without prejudice to the responsibility of  the Rescue Coordination Centre, and unless 
otherwise specified in the operational plan, priority should be given to disembarkation in the third 
country from where the ship carrying the persons departed or through the territorial waters 
or search and rescue region of  which that ship transited and if  this is not possible, priority 
should be given to disembarkation in the host Member State unless it is necessary to act otherwise 
to ensure the safety of  these persons.82
In the event of  a scarce collaboration by third states of  origin or transit, the burden of  
accepting disembarkation should lie on the host Member State. This choice presents its own 
intrinsic rationality, though not being the only conceivable, and it is open to different solutions 
to be specified in the operational plan of  the mission.
Malta reacted very critically, announcing it would not host Frontex operations on its 
territory anymore.83 Later on, Malta expressed its readiness to host the 2010 Nautilus IV 
operation on condition that the operational plan specified that illegal immigrants rescued by 
the EU’s sea patrols would be disembarked at the nearest safe port (i.e. very often Lampedusa 
80 See Doc. COMSAR 14/17, 19 March 2010, Report to the Maritime Safety Committee, §§ 10.14-10.17.
81 Part II, § 1.2.
82 Part II, § 2.1 (emphasis added). In similar terms, see doc. COM (2013) 197, qtd., under Article 10, §§ 3-4.
83 See <www.independent.com.mt/news.asp?newsitemid=103632>; <www.timesofmalta.com/articles/
view/20090426/local/rescued-immigrants-to-disembark-at-the-closest-safe-port>.
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or Sicily).84 It seems that the EU decision did not succeed in solving the outstanding issue of  
the choice of  the place of  disembarkation both in the case when two or more Member States 
are involved and in the limited case of  a Frontex-led operation. The ball goes back into the 
IMO’s field.
VI. NEW APPROACHES CURRENTLY UNDER STUDY BY THE IMO: TOWARDS A 
REGIONAL TREATY FOR THE MEDITERRANEAN SEA?
Following a proposal put forward during the debate that took place in the 2010 COMSAR 
sub-committee, the IMO Secretary General offered his good offices for consultation among a 
group of  interested states of  the Mediterranean Basin. The MSC approved such an approach.85 
One meeting was held in 2010, and two were held in the first half  of  2011, in which Italy, Malta86 
and Spain participated, during which it was agreed to develop a draft regional agreement on 
concerted procedures relating to the disembarkation of  persons rescued at sea. The COMSAR 
Sub-Committee endorsed the proposal during its 2011 meeting and stated that such a regional 
agreement might serve as a ‘pilot scheme,’ which, if  successful, could be extended to other 
parts of  the world experiencing the same or similar situations.87
Moreover, during the 2011 meetings of  this consultation group, it was agreed to expand 
the consultation to include other interested parties concerned (starting with Mediterranean 
countries) and relevant regional and international organizations,88 and that the first ‘expanded’ 
meeting would be held in Rome on 12 October 2011.89 Subsequently, the IMO Secretariat was 
advised by the consultation group that the intention was to develop the regional agreement in 
the form of  a Memorandum of  Understanding (MoU).90
The first regional meeting was attended by countries of  the Mediterranean region 
(Algeria, Cyprus, France, Greece, Italy, Lebanon, Malta, Morocco, Spain, Turkey), by the 
United Kingdom and by the IMO Secretariat. The draft terms of  reference were approved in 
principle, and a draft regional MoU was considered and partly revised during that meeting. In 
84 See <www.independent.com.mt/news.asp?newsitemid=105294>.
85 See Report of the Maritime Safety Committee on Its Eighty-Seventh Session, Doc. MSC 87/26, 25 May 2010, 
§§ 14.18-14.21.
86 Malta did not participate to the second meeting.
87 See Doc. COMSAR 15/16, 29 March 2011, Report to the Maritime Safety Committee, 
§ 10.10. See also the Report of the Legal Committee on the Work of Its Ninety-Eighth 
Session, Doc. LEG 98/14, 18 April 2011, § 13.25.
88 See the Note by the Secretariat on the progress made on the development of a draft Regional agreement on 
concerted procedures relating to the disembarkation of persons rescued at sea, Doc. MSC 89/INF.23, 12 April 
2011.
89 See the Note by the Secretariat on the progress made on the development of a draft Regional agreement 
on concerted procedures relating to the disembarkation of persons rescued at sea, Doc. FAL 37/6/1, 1 July 2011.
90 See Doc. FAL 37/WP.1, 9 September 2011, § 6.32.
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order to make significant progress towards finalizing the draft regional MoU, it was considered 
beneficial to hold informal consultations among interested parties to agree on some of  
the more contentious issues and associated draft texts before organizing the next regional 
formal meeting. Accordingly, informal consultations of  interested parties were held at IMO 
headquarters on 21 February 2012: some of  the most contentious aspects were discussed 
and agreements reached on sensitive subjects, and the draft text of  the regional MoU was 
improved accordingly.91
A second formal regional meeting, to review the draft MoU, was planned to be held on 
18 April 2012 at IMO Headquarters.92 However, during the 2013 COMSAR Sub-Committee 
session (held in January 2013), the Secretariat informed Member States that, following a request 
for more time to be given for informal consultations between some parties concerned, the 
meeting had been postponed and would be rescheduled in the near future. The sub-committee 
took note of  this development and invited the MSC to extend the target completion year for 
this planned output to 2014.93 Bilateral consultations have continued in the last few months, 
and apparently some differences have been smoothed, but it is not still certain, at the moment 
of  writing, when the regional meeting will be reconvened.94
VII. FINAL REMARKS
Irregular migration by sea puts the search and rescue regime under high pressure. If  
some persistent ambiguity in the relevant provisions of  SOLAS and SAR Conventions is a 
natural consequence of  the need to take into account the peculiarities of  the context, the high 
numbers of  SAR operations (and of  the related need to assume responsibilities for asylum 
seekers and irregular migrants) has exacerbated the matters of  controversy, especially in the 
Mediterranean. IMO could reach a certain degree of  consensus only on general rules and 
accompanying guidelines, but was unable to eliminate the ultimate grounds for divergence 
among its Member States: this is particularly evident in the tension between Italy and Malta. 
Nor has the EU been successful in drawing a precise line so far.
The reasons underlying the lack of  adequacy of  the current legal regime of  SAR matters 
are grounded in other fields, i.e. the migratory policies and other priorities of  some destination 
states, the issue of  burden sharing among interested countries, the difficulty (both political and 
legal) of  effectively dealing with some origin or transit states.
91 See Doc. COMSAR 15/16, 29 March 2011, Report to the Maritime Safety Committee, § 10.3.
92 Invitation were extended to the Governments of Albania, Algeria, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia, Cyprus, 
Egypt, France, Greece, Israel, Italy, Lebanon, Libya, Malta, Monaco, Montenegro, Morocco, Slovenia, Spain, the 
Syrian Arab Republic, Tunisia, Turkey and the United Kingdom.
93 Information courteously provided by the IMO Secretariat on 25 February 2013.
94 Information courteously provided by the Head of the Facilitation Section (Maritime Safety Division, IMO) 
and by the IMO External Relations Office on 27 February 2013 and on 10 July 2013.
74
Paix et Securité Internationales
Num. 1, janvier-décembre 2013
IRREGULAR MIGRATION ACROSS THE MEDITERRANEAN SEA: PROBLEMATIC ISSUES 
CONCERNING THE INTERNATIONAL RULES ON SAFEGUARD OF LIFE AT SEA
Certainly, promoting a cooperative approach tailored to the common problems affecting 
a given region – as IMO is trying to do with the Mediterranean states – appears to be a 
correct way to proceed.95 However, as underlined by UNHCR in some recent initiatives and 
positions, the connected problem of  the responsibility for asylum seekers and refugees must 
be tackled as a matter of  priority96; to this end, the issues posed by irregular migrants and by 
their eventual repatriation must also be matched, not leaving alone the states more exposed 
to incoming flows.
Towards this end, I think that a crucial role in the Mediterranean should be played by 
the EU and its Member States, taking into account that the main problems at stake concern 
or involve them in a substantial way. A more effective system of  burden sharing97 among EU 
Member States could pave the way for fruitful talks about the disembarkation procedures and 
the delimitation of  SAR zones (both among EU Member States and between them and third 
states, in the framework of  the process sponsored by IMO), obliging the interested actors to 
take more transparent and verifiable stances.
Additionally, a cohesive EU would be stronger and more credible interacting with transit 
countries and origin countries on the complex issues raised by international migration. In 
such a perspective, addressing some root causes and proposing a truly global approach might 
help in reducing irregular flows and the related worrying negative side effects on the human 
rights of  migrants. It is time to abandon the idea that challenges raised by irregular migratory 
movements may be faced only (or almost exclusively) with repressive instruments or security-
based preventive tactics. Equally, it must be clear that cooperative deals may not be made 
with whatsoever state, no matter how decisive its support may be for contrasting smugglers98: 
human rights come first, as authoritatively asserted by the European Court of  Human Rights 
in the recent Hirsi judgment.
95 To this views, see also TREIVISANUT, S., loc. cit., 2010, pp. 525-526 and 538-539.
96 UNHCR, Summary Conclusions of the Expert Meeting in Djibouti (8-10 November 2011). Refugees and 
Asylum-Seekers in Distress at Sea – How Best to Respond?, 5 December 2011, §§ 22-23 (and the annexed 
Model Framework for Cooperation following rescue at sea operations involving asylum-seekers and refugees); 
Background Paper, qtd.
97 A system of burden sharing undoubtedly must include the vexed question of the relocation of asylum 
seekers and refugees (a sort of taboo so far for many EU Member States, firmly opposing any preventive legal 
engagement), but should also embrace enhanced forms of support, to be built upon existing tools such as RAPID 
and EASO expert teams, and upon good practices like the Praesidium Project. See also the idea of setting up 
‘Mobile Protection Response Teams’, advanced by the UNHCR, Background Paper, ANN, B; Summary 
Conclusions of the Expert Meeting in Djibouti, §§ 20-21.
98 See the discussion on the concept of “place of safety”, supra § 4.
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ADDENDUM
This article was completed in late August 2013, some weeks before the outcry caused 
by a tragic incident occurred near the shores of  Lampedusa on 3rd of  October, leading to 
the death of  at least 366 persons in just one night. Apart from the condolences and the on-
the-spot declarations released by many politicians (both of  European States and of  the EU 
itself), no change of  perspective has been pushed ahead. Again, a security-based approach 
seems to be preferred again and again, with the reinforcement of  control devices (such as 
Frontex and Eurosur) which will probably lead smugglers to opt for even more dangerous or 
degrading techniques to circumvent the controls and allow migrants to reach the European 
“promised land”. Only in part, the issue of  a more balanced burden sharing seems to have 
gained momentum in European circles, following a strong call coming from the Italian 
government: anyway, precise legal provisions and political orientations are still lacking and 
further substantial discussions are postponed to the meeting of  the European Council of  
June 2014.
In the meanwhile, the ongoing discussion on the new regulation on the Frontex-led 
operations at sea records a worrying aptitude by six EU Mediterranean States (Cyprus, France, 
Greece, Italy, Malta, and Spain): those States formalized in a joint document (No. 14612/13 
of  10 Oct. 2013) their strong opposition to Articles 9 and 10 of  the draft proposal of  the 
Commission. They underlined the lack of  competence of  the EU to legislate on SAR matters, 
the presence of  an extensive regulation at international level and the risk to create legal 
confusion (sic!), and, in any case, the sufficiency of  a quick reference to applicable international 
law and to supplementary arrangements to be included each time in the relevant operational 
plan. At the time of  writing, a compromise proposal was advanced by the Council Presidency 
in document No. 16825/13 of  27 Nov. 2013.
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